

first act of war is delivered in secret, and is only made known to the public, if ever it is at all, when too late. The fatal blow is struck, and all that remains to the people is to grumble and fight. But all this will be changed when, as political knowledge becomes more widely spread, the executive as well as the legislative branches shall, in all or most countries, be thoroughly leavened with the democratic spirit. This infusion of the democratic element by no means implies organic changes in such constitutions as ours; but it does imply the ready continuance of that flexible adaptation of old institutions to new requirements that has been acted upon in England for nearly two centuries.

It is to such continuous progress that we hopefully look to avert the possibility that a few men may "with a light heart" plunge a helpless nation into the horrors of a needless war. It is true that even in democracies there will always be a few thoughtless, excitable, and, perhaps, interested persons, who will shout loudly about "honour and glory;" but it is not they, the noisy hundreds, it is the silent millions who constitute the nation. And when the time comes that it shall be the suffrage of these silent millions by which the question of peace or war will be decided, we confidently hope that international wars among civilised countries will become rarer and rarer as matters of fact, until they gradually dwindle into matters of history.

But let us now inquire whether there may not be some shorter and speedier way to put an end to the baneful war-system.

CHAPTER XII.

The Principle of Arbitration—Possible Federation of European States for Settlement of International Disputes—Suggested Council of the United States of Europe—Hero-worship—Pseudo-Patriotism.

4. THE principle of arbitration. There are three ways in which men in private life settle their disputes:—(1) by compulsory arbitration through legal tribunals; (2) by voluntary arbitration; and (3) by personal combat or duelling. Of these three ways the last is the most illogical, absurd, and idiotic, and has almost fallen into disuse. No one will surely, in the present day, argue that the most proper mode of settling a dispute between two persons as to their respective rights to a piece of land, or to a sum of money, is that they should fight, and that the matter in dispute should be adjudged to the conqueror. And yet of the three ways named, the last, being by far the most preposterous, is the only one that is used in the settlement of international disputes. It is not that any one professes to admire it. It is universally condemned as irrational, clumsy, cruel, barbarous, and productive of infinite misery to mankind; but still it is the only mode resorted to. Any other, it is said, would be preferable, but unfortunately there is no other! What an opprobrium to man's heart and brain should this be true! He has pressed the mystic forces of nature into his service, and yet he is impotent to improve on the barbaric internationalism of the Goths and Vandals! Truly, a marvellous incongruity!

But let us see. Of the two other modes in which private disputes are adjusted, the first, viz., compulsory arbitration through a legal tribunal, is inapplicable to international disputes, for there is at present no tribunal which can compel nations to resort to it, or even if they did, could enforce its decisions. But the second, viz., voluntary arbitration, is quite open to those national litigants who, only seeking what is right and fair, are willing not to be judges in their own cause, but to leave it to the adjudication of disinterested third parties. In a few instances, mostly of recent date, this rational, speedy, and inexpensive mode of settling international differences has been adopted with satisfactory results. Of course, as is always the case, the losers have grumbled. But even they must admit that a defeat, through the arbitrament of able and impartial men, is a thousand-fold preferable to a victory through the arbitrament of a ruinous and sanguinary war.

It may appear strange that so simple, cheap, and speedy a solution of "difficulties" between nation and nation should not hitherto have been resorted to with more frequency. But a variety of circumstances explain this. Supposing a dispute to arise between a powerful and a comparatively weak nation, it is quite intelligible that the former, confident of victory from superior military force, will hardly forego that advantage and accept arbitration which places both parties on a precisely equal footing. Again, supposing the disputants to be, or to fancy that they are, of equal military strength, one of them, at least, may be

conscious that his case will prove weak in the eyes of equitable men, and prefer to confide it to the arbitrament of physical force.

There is no lack of pretexts under which a government may decline arbitration without impugning the general principle. It may say, "Our case is so clear that there is nothing to arbitrate about;" or, "the honour of our country is at stake, and we cannot leave that to be adjudicated upon by any third parties;" or, "what guarantee have we that our adversary will be coerced in case that he should refuse compliance with an adverse verdict?" or it may use other plausible pleas. The probability that the stronger will decline the overtures of the less strong, whatever may be their respective rights or wrongs, is the weak point of the voluntary arbitration system. There is no controlling power either to compel its adoption or to enforce its verdicts. If, of two contending powers, one proposes and the other declines arbitration, it may as a rule, be inferred that the former has most confidence in the justice of its cause, and the latter most confidence in the superiority of its strength.

Nevertheless the principle is admitted by all to be sound in the abstract, and its adoption in practice will no doubt become more and more frequent, especially in contentions of secondary importance. In the case of wars of aggrandisement (under the pleas of "rectification of frontiers," precautions against future possible aggression, &c., &c.); or of wars of intervention (under the pleas of the maintenance of the balance of power, the

repression of anarchy, &c., &c.); or of all other wars of which ambition and cupidity are the main-springs, the aggressors are not at all likely to submit their proceedings to the ordeal of arbitration, justly apprehensive lest the award should be against them. And these unfortunately constitute that class of wars which are the most frequent, the most enduring, and the most sanguinary. By what means, then, are we to obtain the agency of some extraneous, over-ruling authority that shall convert voluntary into compulsory arbitration?

5. The possible federation of European states for the exclusive purpose of settling international disputes. If the seventeen states of which Europe is now composed (or most of them) entered into a solemn treaty whereby they agreed to submit all disputes between them to the decision of a Council to consist of representatives appointed by each in fair proportion to their respective populations, the difficulty of making arbitration compulsory would be met, and a mighty problem would be solved. In the Appendix to this work we give a rough sketch of some of the leading features and conditions which the formation of a Council of the United States of Europe might involve. We submit that sketch quite tentatively, and as the merest vague outline. There may be twenty other preferable modes of accomplishing the same object, and of these, whichever proves the most practicable will be the best. For it is the impracticability of the scheme that is urged as its chief, if not almost its only, objection. "Highly praiseworthy and very philanthropic, and all that," it will be said, "but utterly chimerical and

visionary." To the former we quite agree, but we dissent from the latter. What is there visionary in a treaty between several civilised nations having for its object to secure general and permanent peace between them? If such a treaty were proposed by two or three of the great powers, is it visionary to suppose that most of the rest would join? Why, the simultaneous existence of two Grandison-Bismarcks, each swaying one of the leading states of Europe, might at once convert the vision into a fact!

But, irrespectively of a combination so desirable, our faith is in the constantly increasing influence of popular opinion upon all, even the most autocratic, governments of the world, and the gradual infusion of the popular element into their constitution. In proportion as the schoolmaster and the press are educating the people, so are great changes being wrought. Each country is becoming more of a nation and less of a state. The people are displaying comparative indifference at becoming collectively greater, and increased solicitude for becoming individually happier. The glory and advancement of that abstract entity, the state, are beginning to be subordinated to the paramount object of securing the special well-being of the men, women, and children of which it is composed. These are the important changes to which the democratic tendencies of the age are leading, and every step in that direction is a step towards the adoption of a war-discarding international polity.

The war-arbitrament system would not have endured as long as it has, but for its supposed

indispensability. It has been far too easily taken for granted that there is no escape from the fatal necessity that exists for human beings butchering each other before the survivors can come to an understanding. True that poets and preachers, philosophers and philanthropists, have made war the theme of much eloquent declamation, but none have so stoutly denied its necessity, and so clearly pointed out its remedy or alternative, as to remove from the bulk of mankind the impression that war is inseparably interwoven in the frame of our social organisation, and forms the *sine quâ non* of civilisation. This fallacy is fatal to all improvement. To fancy war indispensable is to make it so. But the world is beginning to know better. The moment that war ceases to be regarded as the inevitable destiny of man, it is doomed. Its fetichism once destroyed, the wretched old idol will quickly be deposed from its altar.

What the millions who form the main body of all nations require is a fair share of physical comforts, and of leisure for mental culture. These are the two fundamental conditions of human happiness. With these, every degree, without these, no degree, of elevation in the scale of being can be generally reached. War forms one of the greatest obstacles to the realisation of both these conditions, and the millions, when, and as, they obtain political power, will have to choose between foregoing the requirements, or demolishing the obstacles. Already, thoughtful and far-seeing statesmen are casting their looks forward at the coming changes in the objects of future statesman-

ship. More and more, the happiness of the people rather than the glory of the state—attention to domestic improvements rather than to foreign politics—the furtherance of wealth-creation through peace rather than of wealth-destruction through war, will form the leading features in the state-policy of all free nations. The old system of isolating the various communities into which Europe is divided—making their interests, which are naturally identical, artificially conflicting—and so placing each at enmity, if not at war, with the other, has been fully tried and found wanting.

It is true that in certain respects this old system has undergone some improvement. Things were, for instance, worse still when England was a heptarchy—Italy a bundle of petty dukedoms, or small oligarchies (erroneously called republics)—and when France, Germany, Spain, &c., were torn by intestine wars between the numberless townships, provinces, electorates, and other feudal independencies into which each was split up. In the course of ages much of this has been changed, and numerous small statelets have merged into one large state. The questions that had occasioned frequent and almost hereditary wars between two neighbouring districts were now referred to and decided by the government into which both had merged; and the differences that had cost the disputants a perennial flow of blood and treasure were finally settled by compulsory arbitration. What we now suggest is that this improvement should continue its course, and that the same remedy, viz., compulsory arbitration, that put a

stop to wars between province and province of the same country, should be applied to put a stop to wars between country and country of the same continent.

That the people of the small districts formerly hostile and destructive to each other are far happier now that their incorporation into the same state has suppressed their feuds—that those whom mutual hatred once estranged and who rarely met but in conflict, should now find it much more pleasant and profitable to trade with each other than to fight with each other, who can doubt? And equally, who can doubt that the people constituting the nations which are now jealous of, isolated from, and which have interests, not naturally but artificially, pitted against each other, would be infinitely happier if arbitration permanently settled their differences and thus removed all causes for jealousy and isolation? But some will say, "That is impossible! National jealousies will never be extirpated." So was it once said of the feuds between Cumberland and the Scottish borders, between Normandy and Brittany, between Castile and Arragon, between Florence and Pisa, &c., &c. And yet these irreconcilable foes have now become friendly and fraternal members of the same state. Beware of fixing the limits of the possible. The "impossible" has come to pass in the instances quoted as well as in many others, and will assuredly come again to pass in the extinction of inter-European war so soon as human volition shall be energetically directed to that end.

That each nation would be contented with its boundaries were they once for all definitely fixed by some recognised authority, such as the suggested Council of the United States of Europe, is not only consonant to reason, but also to experience, as exemplified in the United States of America. No disputes ever arise between any of the latter as to whether a few square miles of territory belong to the one or to the other. Congress has clearly defined once for all their respective limits, and with that demarcation each state is perfectly satisfied. In the same way the people that compose the various nations of Europe would see that they could derive no real accession to their happiness from using brute force at an extravagant cost of blood and treasure in order to wrest a province from a neighbouring country. If left to themselves the people would probably not care, and would certainly not go to war, for such addition to their territory.

It is not the bulk of a nation—that is to say, its peasants, labourers, artizans, shopkeepers, &c.—who threaten with slaughter and devastation the peasants, labourers, artizans, and shopkeepers of another nation. These classes in one country bear no ill-will against the corresponding classes in the other country. To cut each other's throats is the last thing they would think of until compelled by their rulers to meet armed for that express purpose. Democracy would gladly hail a permanent and final map of Europe, while statecraft is perpetually patching, cobbling, and tinkering it, and thus keeps up an ever-festering sore.

As a rule, both the real and the assigned grounds for a war between two countries are slight and easily removable at first. But as negotiations proceed, the discussion assumes a wider range and a less courteous tone; a word is perhaps inadvertently dropped which is construed into a threat or an affront, the dispute is envenomed, the controversy becomes so hot that the veneer of diplomacy blisters off, each party waxes wroth, and finally war ensues. In all these cases a resort to a central and supreme body such as the Council of the United States of Europe, would have settled the dispute long before the introduction of disagreeable adjectives had increased the difficulty of the task. Neither could there be any loss of dignity in an appeal to such a tribunal or in submission to its decision, since each disputant would be fairly represented in it, and would only be obeying a decree to which he himself, by implication, was a party. He would be, not the judge, but a judge, in his own cause.

6. Hero-worship and pseudo-patriotism. Both these faults are founded on feelings which, beneficial in their origin and nature, have been so strained and warped as to have become enlisted in the cause of violence and discord. Of violence, by the worship of physical-force heroes—of discord, by a clannish exclusiveness miscalled patriotism. It is natural for average men to admire those who tower above the average; and it is also natural for us to love with a special fondness our families, friends, and neighbours, and the spot of earth which is connected with our earliest associations. But when our

admiration is claimed for so worthless a man as Frederick the Great simply because he was successful, or when our love for those around us merges into aversion and contempt for other men because they live far away, then we object to the unreasoning exaggeration which confounds good and evil.

Hero-worship is the blind adoration of success by whatever means achieved, and of power for whatever purposes exercised. In most cases, it is through the instrumentality of war that such success and power have been attained, and thus war itself obtains a share of the admiration and worship which they receive. Naseby, Blenheim, and Austerlitz, are identified with the wonderful fortunes of Cromwell, Marlborough, and Napoleon, and the habit is contracted of glorifying war for its romantic results, without reference to its sinister influence on the destinies of mankind. The abolition of war will fearfully diminish the number of future heroes, and hero-worshippers will be compelled to fall back on their old, hackneyed idols, from Alexander of Macedon to Buonaparte of Corsica. Otherwise they will have to bow to tamer and more beneficent deities, whose rites do not necessitate countless human sacrifices.

The true patriot entertains a sincere love for his country and for his countrymen, and would undergo much labour, perhaps much suffering, to serve their interests. The pseudo-patriot thinks this not enough. To him, not only is his country dear, but other countries are obnoxious, and he both envies and fears their prosperity. He carries

his love for his own people, which is laudable, to the extent of aversion to all other people, which is absurd and reprehensible. Pseudo-patriotism is founded on a prevalent but pernicious fallacy, viz., that the prosperity of a nation is marred and injured by the prosperity of other nations. This fatal error has largely contributed to perpetuate those jealousies, rivalries, and armed conflicts, out of which it originally sprung. If the intercourse between all nations had been pacific and free, such a notion could never have existed. Abolish jealousy and exclusiveness, and it becomes transparently obvious that the more each country prospers, the more the entire world prospers. The more universal the activity in creating wealth, the better for all everywhere.

That one community should be poorer cannot make other communities richer; on the contrary, the latter then have a bad customer instead of a good one. Still less can one country be the wealthier from the rest being in poverty, for its interchanges will be proportionately fewer, and its intercourse with them less fruitful. It might as well be contended that California would flourish all the more if the industries of Alabama were to decay, and its productions were curtailed; or that it would be an advantage to Kent if Lancashire were unprosperous. No! rightly understood, there is a solidarity of well-being throughout the nations of the world. None can suffer without the sum of human happiness being diminished, and some glad ray is reflected over all when the welfare of a part is cheered by brighter aspects.

It is true that the significance of this universal identity of human interests cannot be realised to its full extent while nations stand opposed to each other in actual or contingent warfare, or are isolated from each other by restrictions on commercial intercourse. But by making it abundantly clear, and widely known, that these two evil influences form the chief obstacles to the general welfare of mankind, additional strength and stimulus will be given to the efforts which are being made to remove them.

As regards the first obstacle, as long as nations are likely to be brought into war-collision, owing to the antagonism of supposed political interests, it is quite conceivable that each should view with a pang of regret the prosperity of the rest. Whatever strengthens one party makes the other relatively weaker. The comparative happiness of one people is an opprobrium to the rulers of another people who are not happy. A rapid progress in wealth, and therefore in latent power, of some states, is gall and wormwood to those states whose relative political prestige and influence are thereby impaired, and to whom political prestige and influence are the only tests of national greatness. This feeling is by no means unnatural under the present artificial and hollow system of national rivalry and political antagonism. No doubt it is wicked to rejoice at the calamities of others, and to feel disgusted at their prosperity; but, wicked or not, it is logical when men are artificially so pitted against each other as that the progress of our neighbours becomes a menace, more or less direct,

to ourselves. Were it not for the prevalence of the war-arbitrament system, such a feeling, instead of being wicked but logical, would be both wicked and absurd. There would cease to be a contradiction between what was unconditionally just, and what was, under certain conditions, logical. The anomaly to which we object is founded on the doctrines which proclaim that the interests of men are opposed to each other—that their natural and normal state is that of war—and that the less we are assisted by the labours of others the better we are off ourselves.

So, too, as regards the second obstacle, commercial isolation. Besides other adverse economical results, such as the partial annulment of the greatest factor of human productiveness, the division of labour, and the compulsory diversion of industry from naturally fertile to comparatively barren employment, &c., there are other disadvantages in more immediate connection with the subject on which we are engaged. The population of the world at large, who, left to themselves, would become closely knit together by a mutual inter-dependence on each other for the supply of their wants, are interdicted from these friendly and mutually advantageous relations; and are forcibly cut up into a variety of districts, some large, some small, called countries, each of which is to supply its own wants, and to have as little commercial intercourse as possible with other districts. This small planet of ours is to be dissected into a certain number of smaller planets, each to be ticketed, "No connection with the planets on

the other side of the sea, or river, or mountain range (as the case may be). Interchanges strictly forbidden. No barter permitted of what we can produce better than they can for what they can produce better than we can." The more efficient the protective system, the more complete the isolation. It is only its impotence beyond a certain point that permits any international trade whatever to be possible. War isolation and trade isolation assist each other in dividing the world into hostile tribes, and in preventing that natural fusion of their interests under which the good of a part, far from being opposed to, or incompatible with, is the promoter of the good of the whole.

In discussing the chances of the war-system coming to an end, either through the *reductio ad absurdum* of the expenditure of money and the destruction of life being carried beyond the bounds of human toleration, or through the common accord of civilised nations, we have confined our attention chiefly to Europe. For it is there that the science of war has received its greatest development, and the art of war its most complete and expensive organisation, so that the abolition of the war-system in Europe would be pretty well tantamount to its universal abolition among civilised nations. Indeed, out of Europe (that cradle of modern civilisation) wars are few, and comparatively on a small scale. The English-speaking communities who are gradually filling up the vacant spaces on our globe, most wisely (and may their beneficial wisdom be contagious) devote themselves to the arts of peace. China, with a population exceeding

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that of Europe, spends the merest trifle (compared with Europe's peace footing of £166,000,000 per annum) on military establishments. The combined inter-tribal wars of all the African races do not probably cost as many lives yearly as were sacrificed in the single battle of Waterloo. It is to Europe, supreme in refinement and culture, that the guilt of bloodthirstiness mostly attaches—and it is to Europe, fertile in intellects of the highest order, that we must look to redeem herself from that frightful sin. Surely the preservation of human life, and the elimination of human misery, should be the primary objects of human efforts.

We now take leave of a subject of which the importance has led us into a lengthened discussion. We have carefully and thoughtfully considered the question of "Wars and international rivalries" as forming one of the most formidable impediments to wealth-creation. We have depicted the evils of war, and we have gainsaid its necessity. Its evils all admit, though in a vague and general way: here we have catalogued and inventoried them. Its necessity all have assumed, though only in a vague and general way: here we have directly impugned and contested it. We distinctly deny the necessity for war, and we call on all those to whom man's future is an object of interest to investigate the subject boldly and searchingly. It is our thorough conviction that we are right, and that if men will only boldly face the problem it will soon be solved.

Of one thing we are quite certain, viz.—that thousands and thousands of human hearts will beat in unison with ours, will lovingly cling to

the hope that we may be right, and will suffer a chill of apprehension lest we might chance to be wrong. Good instincts leap forward, while feeble reason slowly creeps. There is hardly a man—certainly not a woman—who would not feel profound grief and humiliation if it were clearly demonstrable that there is no alternative for the settlement of disputes between men and men beyond the savage arbitrament of war—grief, for the cruel evils from which there is to be no relief, and humiliation at the miserable shortcomings of human efforts. For what are the ends and aims of our boasted civilisation? Surely not the mere pursuit of and progress in art and science! These are only means to the real end. The real end is the physical and mental well-being of mankind—that is, not of any special country, or class, or section, but of all the human beings who are within the pale and sit under the banner of civilisation. A civilisation which endows us with steam and telegraphy, but cannot emancipate us from the horrors of war, is impotent and abortive. It falls short of its mission. It gives us those scientific improvements which man might in truth be happy without, but leaves untouched those social iniquities which man cannot be happy with. Of what avail are the marvellous conquests of science to the great bulk of mankind, while they are condemned to hereditary poverty and ignorance by vicious institutions—such as war, commercial isolation, and other obstacles to wealth-creation?

No doubt our progress in science and art tends not only to increase the enjoyments of the

rich, but also to alleviate the privations of the poor; but its beneficent operation in the latter direction is checked and counteracted by the vicious institutions just referred to; and civilisation is incomplete and abortive until those fertile causes of human misery are abolished. They can be abolished, for they exist through man's volition; and the power which instituted can annul them. That they will before long be abolished we earnestly trust, and we fervently entreat the co-operation of all who read these pages to that end. Every one can contribute something towards it by thought, or word, or deed, or vote. Let us never weary or despond, but pledge ourselves to work, and still to work, and ever to work, according to our means, in so holy a cause.

CHAPTER XIII.

Commercial Isolation—Protectionist Fallacies—Balances Due by one Country to Another are not Paid in Specie—All Commerce is Barter.

B. 4. COMMERCIAL ISOLATION.—We have fully expatiated in our earlier pages on the manifold advantages afforded by the "Division of labour," and by "Free commercial intercourse." We therefore shall have the less to say as to the evils of "Commercial isolation." For the evils of the latter mainly consist in ignoring and abjuring the manifold advantages on which we have already so emphatically dwelt. The higher the estimation

in which those advantages are held, the greater must be our appreciation of the evils and losses incurred by curtailing our availment of them. That curtailment statesmen have effected by cutting off industrially one country from the other, and substituting narrow and sectional for world-wide international division of labour. Whether countries be large or small, the isolation system (that is to say the protective system), in its logical completeness, decides that the division of labour shall not carry its operations beyond the boundaries of each; that the people who dwell within those boundaries shall not avail themselves of the co-operation of the people who dwell beyond those boundaries; and that they shall each supply their own wants as though there were no other countries or people in existence. In this way they will be "independent of foreigners."

Foreigners! A term implying a certain measure of contumely and reproach, as though "foreigners" were not brother-men accidentally born under a different longitude and latitude, and accidentally placed, by barbaric mediæval brute force, in a distinct section of the globe called another country—as though "foreigners" were inborn enemies and natural objects of repulsion! Well, be it so. The isolated nation will be "independent of foreigners." Very true; but it will forfeit all the advantages of the division of labour on a large scale. It cannot possibly enjoy at once the incompatible privileges of isolation and of co-operation. Under the isolation system each country is to produce enough of everything for