

couraging to find that they are by no means insuperable. It therefore behoves all men to lend a hand in the good work of overcoming them.

CHAPTER VIII.

Wars and International Rivalries—Various Modes in which War is Injurious—Annual Expenditure on Armaments in time of Peace—Vast Number of Unproductive Consumers.

B 3. WARS AND INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES.—Every one freely admits the destructiveness, the irrationality, and the wickedness of war; but it is at the same time taken for granted that man is so constituted that war is a condition inseparable from his existence, whether in a state of barbarism or of civilisation. In other words, war is put forth as a deplorable but necessary evil. We readily admit the deplorableness of the evil, but we deny the necessity of its existence. Let us briefly glance at both aspects of the question, and inquire:—(A) As to the extent of the evil; and (B) As to its necessity. If we find the evil to be great and the necessity for it to be small, we shall at least know in what direction and with what hopes we may steer our course.

A. The extent of the evil. The calamities of war form one of the most hackneyed of themes; and every epithet of revilement has been heaped on the system, with but few attempts at practical reform. There is no man who does not shake his head in condemnation of the wickedness of war, and hardly one who does not at the same time

shrug his shoulders to signify his sad acquiescence in its necessity. But while the world is almost unanimous in professing a general, sweeping, and speculative detestation and depreciation of war, few people have closely analysed the subject, or carefully considered: (*a*) the variety of modes in which it injures mankind; (*b*) the constantly growing increase of the evil; and (*c*) the tendency of the modern military system in Europe to more and more extend the baneful effects of war over the period of peace. We shall call attention to each of these topics; for a vague impression prevails that the evils of war mainly resolve themselves into the loss of life and the extra expenditure of money caused by actual hostilities. But it is not so. They inflict other fatal injuries, less intense perhaps individually, but far more wide-spread and permanent, and consequently more pernicious to mankind.

(*a*) The variety of modes in which war is injurious. These may be classed under three heads, viz.:—1. Destruction of life and property. 2. Conversion of productive labourers into unproductive or destructive consumers. 3. Diversion of capital to unproductive or destructive purposes. On the first head, destruction of life and property, we need say very little, for of all the branches of the subject, this is the most obvious and trite. It is the favourite theme of poets and moralists, and it needs no effort on our part to convince our readers that bloodshed and devastation are atrocious crimes as well as unmitigated evils, unless justified by the sternest necessity. We will therefore pass on to the second head, which has

received less attention, although deserving of at least as much.

2. Conversion of productive labourers into unproductive or destructive consumers. On this topic we shall have rather more to say. It is a fact too obvious to admit of dispute that every member of the naval and military services, whether officers or men, consumes without producing. This does not convey the slightest imputation on them. They are engaged by the state to perform certain duties, which, in most cases, are efficiently, and, in some cases are brilliantly, performed, while they are, in the majority of cases, rather under than over-paid. But it is nevertheless the fact, that those duties do not conduce to the creation of wealth. True that they may be necessary for the protection of the wealth-producers, as in the instance of defensive wars. But of the necessity of war we shall treat as a special topic ; at present we are only treating of its evils. And it is undoubtedly a flagrant evil (be it a necessary one or not) that a greater or lesser number of men, in the very prime of life, should be made to withdraw from the beneficent work of production, and to exist only as consumers, at the expense of those who do produce.

In a loose, general way, these evils are freely admitted. "It is no doubt very wasteful," people say, "but a soldier must consume, for he must live ; he cannot produce, for he has something else to do ; and he must destroy, for that is what he is paid for." But those who dismiss the subject in this cursory manner have not formed a definite conception of the amount of the evil and loss involved.

Assuming that occasional wars, and continuous preparations for war, are matters of necessity, let us at least try to ascertain approximatively what this "necessity" costs to the civilised communities of Europe. It must surely be a matter of both importance and interest to obtain some notion as to the price which civilised Europe has annually to pay for this assumed necessity. A man may deem it necessary to keep a carriage, but that is no reason why he should shut his eyes to the annual expense which it entails. We propose, therefore, to frame a rough estimate of the actual amount of wealth absorbed and consumed by the various nations of Europe in consequence of the necessity that is supposed to exist for large military establishments.

Before, however, entering on these calculations, there are two considerations which deserve a few words of remark. In the first place, the armies which, in the present day, are deemed necessary for defence or attack, are infinitely larger than those which formerly decided the fate of nations. The drift of the prevailing system of military organisation is to arm the entire virile population of one country against the entire virile population of another. Governments previous to the nineteenth century pressed into military service only a moderate aliquot part of their people. The armies with which Turenne and Marlborough won their battles and their laurels would scarcely have been sufficient to form a secondary corps in a grand army of the present day. Armies then formed a very small, and now form a very large, percentage of the adult males of every country.

And this tendency to a constant numerical increase of armed forces is being, every year, developed more and more. Each state is jealous of the other, and a contest arises between them as to which shall, even in time of peace, maintain in arms most soldiers in proportion to its population. This contest is a perennial struggle, little less savage in its intent and less costly in its expenditure, than actual war itself. Should this rivalry continue (as appears almost certain) there can be no limit to its development until all the male population in every country, between the ages of eighteen and fifty, shall become soldiers; and even then it may assume other oppressive forms, till it breaks down under the weight of its own absurdity.

In the second place, let us remember that formerly, when a war was terminated, the army was mostly disbanded, and the peace establishment of a country was on a comparatively small scale. But now the military organisation of a state even on the peace footing is on a scale greatly in excess of the war footing of the most bellicose country a century ago. And with the tendency just mentioned to still further increase, and, in great measure, to hold in readiness for action, the military power of each country, we are rapidly nearing the point when there will be little difference between the armaments of Europe in time of war and the same in time of peace. Already, we may almost say that European civilisation is in a perennial and normal state of warlike organisation, and, to a large extent, suffers all the evils of actual war except the secondary and transient ones of

life destroyed and property devastated. For, the more wide-spread and durable evils of lives wastefully spent, and of production wilfully arrested, become, under such a scheme, permanent institutions.

We will now proceed to ascertain, as closely as we can, the number of men composing the army and navy of each European state, as also the annual expenditure of each on military and naval affairs. We may, however, premise that the military organisation that now prevails throughout Europe, except in England and a few minor states, is founded on the principle that every man between the ages of eighteen and fifty is bound to form part of the national army for a certain number of years, and must be trained to arms accordingly. A given proportion of these are yearly drafted into the permanent standing army which is kept up during peace, and the rest are, under various names and regulations, formed into reserves liable, in time of war, or whenever the Government wills it, to be called into active service. The details vary in different countries, but the general principle adopted is the universal liability to serve. Let us take France as an illustration. By a law passed in July, 1872, every Frenchman forms part—(1) of the active army for five years; (2) of the reserve to the active army for four years; (3) of the territorial army for five years; and (4) of the reserve to the territorial army for six years. So that the total duration of the military service, active and contingent, for every male adult Frenchman is twenty years. True, all are not called, but all are liable to be called.

The data comprised in the following table are mostly derived from the "Almanach de Gotha" for

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From the table that precedes, it is visible at a glance that the various states, of which Europe is composed, maintain under arms, during a time of peace, three and a half millions of men at a yearly cost of £156,000,000. It further shows that, in case of a general war, the number of men that would be withdrawn, in the prime of life, from productive employment, and devoted to war purposes, would be increased to ten and half millions, with a more than proportionate increase of expenditure. A more than proportionate increase, because war is in the highest degree destructive and wasteful, and entails multitudinous losses and sacrifices, very far beyond those which a full-armed peace proportionately occasions. If the number of men required to serve on the peace footing is increased three-fold in time of war, viz., from 3,500,000 men to 10,500,000, then the expenditure will be increased, at the very least, six-fold, viz., from £156,000,000 per annum to nearly £1,000,000,000.

It may be said that a war, so general as to involve in it every European nation, is an event not likely to occur. But this unlikely event did occur during the first Napoleonic era. Moreover, if a war did occur in which only four or five states were engaged, it is all but certain that the contending parties would be the great powers of Europe, whose armies form an overwhelming proportion of the totality.

We will, however, adopt, as the basis of our calculations and remarks, the permanent scale of armaments on the peace footing, and not their exceptional expansion under war exigences. Let us

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.	Population.	Annual Expenditure on Army and Navy, Peace footing.	Equivalent in £ sterling.	Army and Navy, Peace footing, Men.	Army and Navy, War footing, Men.	Annual Cost of each Man and of his quota of Military or Naval Equipment on Peace footing.
Austria-Hungary (including Landwehr) ..	38,000,000	Fl. 124,000,000	£12,400,000	280,000	1,105,000	£44 13 0
Belgium	5,500,000	Fr. 44,000,000	1,800,000	45,000	110,000	39 3 0
Denmark	2,100,000	Kr. 14,000,000	750,000	35,000	50,000	21 9 0
France (besides territorial army and reserves)	37,000,000	Fr. 766,000,000	30,640,000	533,000	1,820,000	57 10 0
German Empire (besides field reserves and Landsturm)	42,700,000	Mks. 409,000,000	20,100,000	437,000	1,451,000	46 0 0
Great Britain and Ireland (war footing includes Militia, Volunteers, &c.) ..	35,000,000	£30,700,000	30,700,000	247,000	805,000	124 6 0
Greece	1,700,000	Dr. 12,000,000	500,000	11,500	30,000	43 10 0
Italy (not including territorial militia) ..	28,300,000	L. 537,000,000	9,500,000	315,000	993,000	30 3 0
Netherlands (not including war conscription)	4,000,000	Grs. 33,000,000	2,750,000	89,000	130,000	30 18 0
Portugal	4,700,000	M. 6,000,000	1,350,000	33,000	75,000	40 18 0
Roumania (besides militia)	5,400,000	L. 95,000,000	1,050,000	20,000	54,000	52 10 0
Russia	78,000,000	R. 218,000,000	31,100,000	909,000	2,618,000	31 3 0
Servia (besides reserves)	1,700,000	D. 7,200,000	300,000	10,000	50,000	30 0 0
Spain (including Spanish soldiers in the Colonies)	16,600,000	Pes. 154,000,000	6,160,000	135,000	450,000	46 5 0
Sweden and Norway (besides and reserves) ..	6,400,000	Kr. 30,400,000	1,700,000	55,000	162,000	30 7 0
Switzerland (including reserves)	2,800,000	Fr. 12,800,000	500,000	20,000	201,000	25 0 0
Turkey in Europe (an estimate, being without reliable data)	8,000,000	P. 574,000,000	4,650,000	200,000	450,000	23 5 0
	317,800,000		£155,950,000	3,467,500	10,554,000	
Average annual cost of European soldier or sailor, with quota of equipment, artillery, vessel, &c., on the Peace footing						£45 0 0

1881, corrected and supplemented from various other sources:—

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WEALTH-CREATION.

inquire what proportion of the 3,500,000 men now under arms in Europe on the peace footing, and of the £156,000,000 which they cost, would suffice if European international wars could be superseded by some peaceful mode of settling international disputes. Whether, and how far, such a change of system be possible or impossible, is a question which we shall discuss in another chapter. At present, we are simply inquiring what is the additional tax on the resources of Europe which is inflicted in consequence of the supposed necessity for the existing system of war-arbitrament.

The United States of America afford us a suggestive clew to the solution of this question. This flourishing Federation consists of 38 self-governing states, 50,000,000 of inhabitants, and occupies 3,500,000 square miles of territory. Their army, on a peace footing, numbers 27,000 men, and their total expenditure, in 1880, on every military and naval department, was \$52,000,000 equivalent to about £10,500,000. A contrast with Europe that is most striking and pregnant with meaning! The extent of territory is about the same; the self-governing states in the United States are 38 against only 17 in Europe; the population is 50 millions, rapidly increasing, against 300,000,000 in Europe, very slowly increasing. Compare these figures with 27,000 men under arms in the United States against 3,500,000 in Europe; and a war-expenditure of £10,000,000 in the former, against £156,000,000 in the latter.

Let us now imagine such arrangements to be

made between the seventeen states of which Europe is composed, in regard to the settlement of international differences between them, as would on questions of peace or war constitute them practically the "United States of Europe." It is evident that only a fractional proportion of the armies and navies now maintained by the aggregate of those states would then be required. It is true that for several reasons European armaments could not be for the present reduced to the level of those which suffice for our American brethren. Of these reasons the chief is that many European states indulge in the expensive luxury of "foreign possessions." Now these, "possessions," however much they may conduce to the glory of their proud owners, constitute a heavy and perennial drain upon their resources, and necessitate among other expenses the maintenance of a far much larger army and navy than would otherwise be required. England is the foremost of these owners of foreign possessions. So abundantly are we blessed with them, and so vast is the surface which they present in every part of the globe for contact and collision with adverse or conflicting interests, that the friction is enormous, and the consequence is a constant succession of "little wars" with semi-barbarous nations. And "little" these wars may well be called as to their motives, objects, and results, though they are by no means little as respects their cost to the country.

Having regard therefore to foreign possessions held (as long as they may think them worth holding) by European states, to the varied forms of

government under which the latter exist, to the present want of mutual sympathy between the populations which constitute the European family, and to other special conditions, the military establishments of the "United States of Europe" might still have to remain on a somewhat larger scale than those of the United States of America. But, nevertheless, the abrogation of European international warfare would nearly abolish the need for standing armies, and probably one-tenth of the present expenditure of men and money would meet all national requirements. To err, however, on the right side, let us take the estimate at one-seventh. This would still leave 500,000 armed men to be permanently maintained by the aggregate states of Europe, at an annual expenditure of £24,000,000—an allowance which is superfluously large under the assumed circumstances.

These data supply us with an answer to the inquiry, which we broached at p. 100, as to "what proportion of the 3,500,000 men now under arms in Europe on the peace footing, and of the £156,000,000 which they cost, would suffice if European international wars could be superseded by some peaceful mode of settling international disputes." The saving thereby effected would represent three millions of men and £132,000,000 annually of wealth. Let us look at the significance of these figures.

1. As to the money. The extra £142,000,000 now expended is levied by extra taxation from the populations of Europe, and, therefore, if saved, there would be so much the less to be paid by them annu-

ally. Now, the population of Europe is 318,000,000, distributed into about 70,000,000 families. On an average, therefore, each family in Europe would be a gainer of £2 per annum. Or to place the matter in another light, the aggregate wealth of the people of Europe would be annually increased by £132,000,000. But this is by no means the limit of the money-saving, as we shall see from the remarks that follow.

2. As to the men. Under our hypothesis, three million of men, whose labour is under the existing system utterly unproductive, would be restored to their several fields of productive industry, and each would furnish his quota to the total mass of wealth-creation of the world. In estimating the probable amount of their contributions, we must bear in mind :

(a) That these three million men are in the very prime of manhood (between the ages of eighteen and fifty), and in the full maturity of their physical and intellectual powers.

(b) That from the universal liability of all classes to serve, which is the basis of military organisation throughout continental Europe, the three million of men who would be restored to a career of active productiveness would mostly represent the average productive ability of all classes of society, which is a far higher average than that of soldiers who enlist for a stipend under voluntary enrolment.

(c) In civilised countries, an average male adult produces by his labour (in conjunction with capital and land, whether supplied by himself or by others) a large excess over his own consumption. For

even under the present system that excess of production has sufficed, not only to maintain the women, children, sick, old, and infirm of the community, besides a host of unproductive consumers, but has also sufficed to form out of savings the enormous masses of capital (buildings, ships, railroads, &c., &c., &c.) that now exist. Indeed, every man with sound limbs and a sound brain, should be able to produce the equivalent of what would maintain several human beings—more, under a good; less, under a bad system.

Taking these facts into account, it will be, we think, a low estimate to value the average excess of production over consumption of these three million of men, whose idleness is changed to industry, at £50 per man annually, making a total of £150,000,000. Of course it is not their total annual production that we assume as gain, because under the present system their annual maintenance is included in the £156,000,000 devoted to military and naval expenditure. The profit to the world would be what these 3,000,000 of men would earn in excess of their own maintenance.

We have seen that the average cost of each European soldier is £45; but it must be observed that this sum comprises many other objects besides the maintenance of the soldier in food, clothes, and lodging. It comprises his relative share in all the war material, equipment, and appliances, by means of which his services are utilised—such as artillery, ammunition, horses, ships, fortifications, &c., &c. In a rough way we may assume that about one-half of the

average cost to the state of a soldier goes to his personal maintenance, and the rest to equipment, &c. In the case of a sailor the proportion is somewhat different, as his ship, armament, &c., form a heavier percentage of the total cost. We now proceed to the third head under which we have proposed to discuss "the variety of modes in which war is injurious."

CHAPTER IX.

Annual Cost of the War-system in time of Peace—Annual Cost of the War-system in time of War—Economic Results of the Conversion of Soldiers, &c., into Producers.

3. DIVERSION of capital to unproductive or destructive purposes. In addition to the £156,000,000 annually spent in Europe on war preparations, a very heavy loss is sustained by the dead capital permanently locked up in fortifications, arsenals, ships, horses, barracks, military schools, &c. This capital, the amount of which it is difficult to estimate, but which must be enormous, is sunk unproductively, and yields no return whatever. The world, therefore, loses all the wealth which would have been created through the instrumentality of that capital, had it been in active employment. We shall not attempt to assess this loss, which is obviously a very large one, but must content ourselves with pointing out its existence.

There is, however, one item which is susceptible of easy computation; it is the intercepted earnings